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ATTORNEY'S FEES UNDER THE LANDRUM-GRIFFIN
ACT: THE NEED FOR "UNION THERAPEUTICS"
Whether or not attorney's fees should be awarded to the successful
union member in suits against his union under the enforcement provisions of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of
19591 (hereinafter "LMRDA" or "the Act") has been vigorously litigated. 2 The judgment that an award of attorney's fees is appropriate
now lies within the discretion of the court and depends upon a demonstration that the plaintiffs suit has rendered a "substantial service" to
the union and its members. 3 This Comment will support the proposition that the present standard should be replaced by a procedure
guaranteeing attorney's fees as a matter of right in every successful
LMRDA suit initiated by a union member.4
An award of attorney's fees encourages the filing of meritorious complaints under the LMDRA by reducing the potentially prohibitive
costs of litigation.5 This, in turn, furthers the explicit congressional
intention to promote fair conduct in union-member relations. 6 The process of shifting the successful union member's litigation costs to his
union is "therapeutic ' 7 in that it helps to assure the correction or prevention of union management misconduct. 8 By labeling this process of
shifting attorney's fees "union therapeutics," 9 one recognizes it as a positive and healthful approach in furthering the effectuation of the aims
of the LMRDA.
Relations between labor unions and their members have historically
been plagued by unique problems and possibilities of gross abuse. 10
This state of affairs necessitated congressional passage of the LaborManagement Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959.11 The Act was
1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (1971).
2. See cases cited in notes 26 and 110 infra.
3. See text accompanying notes 129-52 infra.
4. See text accompanying notes 160-71 infra.
5. See text accompanying notes 94-97 infra.
6. See text accompanying notes 12-15 infra.
7. See note 122 and text accompanying note 166 infra.
8. See text accompanying notes 146-49 infra.
9. See note 122 and text accompanying note 166 infra.
10. Note, Counsel Fees Incurred by an Individual Union Member in Pursuit of His
Rights Held to be an Allowable Award under Section 102 of the Labor-Management
Reporting and DisclosureAct, 43 NoTRE DAmm LAw. 574, 580 (1968) (hereinafter cited
as CounselFees].
11. 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (1971).
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designed to "afford necessary protection of the rights and interests

of employees and the public generally"'" by eliminating "instances of
breach of trust, corruption, disregard of the rights of individual employees, and other failures to observe high standards of responsibility

and ethical conduct'

8

by labor officials.' 4

In recognition of those

goals, Congress included in Title Ir, of the LMRDA a Bill of Rights

for union members, i.e., a statement of equal rights,' 6 freedom of speech
and assembly, 1r a provision for the supervision of dues, initiation fees

and assessments,' 8 language protecting a union member's right to sue
12. Id. § 401(b), quoted in Gartner v. Soloner, 220 F. Supp. 115 (E.D. Pa. 1963),
aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 384 F.2d 348 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1040 (1967).
13. 29 U.S.C. § 401(b) (1971).
14. Goldwater, The Union Member as a Person, U. DEr. L.J. 179, 186 (1962).
15. 29 U.S.C. 99 411-15 (1971).
16. Section 101 (a) (1) provides:
EQUAL RIGHTS-Every member of a labor organization shall have equal rights
and privileges within such organization to nominate candidates, to vote in elections
or referendums of the labor organization, to attend membership meetings, and to
participate in the deliberations and voting upon the business of such meetings, subject to reasonable rules and regulations in such organization's constitution and bylaws.
29 U.S.C. § 417(a) (1) (1971).
17. Section 101 (a) (2) provides:
FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND ASSEMBLY-Every member of any labor organization shall have the right to meet and assemble freely with other members;
and to express any views, arguments, or opinions; and to express at meetings of
the labor organization his views, upon candidates in an election of the labor organization or upon any business properly before the meeting, subject to the organization's established and reasonable rules pertaining to the conduct of meetings:
Provided, That nothing herein shall be considered to impair the right of a labor
organization to adopt and enforce reasonable rules as to the responsibility of every
member toward the organization as an institution and to his refraining from conduct that would interfere with its performance of its legal or contractual obligations.
29 U.S.C. § 411(a) (2) (1971).
18. Section 101 (a)(3) provides:
DUES, INITIATION FEES, AND ASSESSMENTS-Except in the case of a federation of national or international labor organizations, the rates of dues and initiation fees payable by members of any labor organization in effect on the date
of enactment of this Act shall not be increased, and no general or special assessment shall be levied upon such members, except(A) in a case of a local labor organization, (i) by majority vote by secret ballot of the members in good standing voting at a general or special membership
meeting, after reasonable notice of the intention to vote upon such question, or
(ii) by majority vote of the members in good standing voting in a membership
referendum conducted by secret ballot; or
(B) in the case of a labor organization, other than a local labor organization
or a federation of national or international labor organizations, (i) by majority
vote of the delegates voting at a regular convention, or at a special convention
of such labor organization held upon not less than thirty days' written notice to
the principal office of each local or constituent labor organization entitled to
such notice, or (ii) by majority vote of the members in good standing of such
labor organization voting in a membership referendum conducted by secret ballot, or (iii) by majority vote of the members of the executive board or similar
governing body of such labor organization, pursuant to express authority contained in the constitution and bylaws of such labor organization: Provided, That
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his union, 19 and safeguards against improper disciplinary actions.2 °
Especially important to the achievement of the legislative goals was

the scheme for judicial enforcement. 2
in relevant part:

Section 102 of the Act reads,

Any person whose rights secured by the provisions of this subchapter
have been infringed by any violation of this subehapter may bring a
civil action in a district court of the United States for such relief (including injunctions) as may be appropriate....22
Title

]H23

of the LMRDA, which concerns the establishment of trust-

eeships over subordinate labor organizations, includes similar language
in its enforcement provision. 4 Section 304 (a) provides, in pertinent
part:
Any member or subordinate body of a labor organization affected by
any violation of this subchapter (except 301) may bring a civil action
in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the
such action on the part of the executive board or similar governing body shall
be effective only until the next regular convention of such labor organization.
29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(3) (1971).
19. Section 101(a) (4) provides:
PROTECTION OF THE RIGHT TO SUE-No labor organization shall limit the
right of any member thereof to institute an action in any court, or in a proceeding
before any administrative agency, irrespective of whether or not the labor organization or its officers are named as defendants or respondents in such action or
proceeding, or the right of any member of a labor organization to appear as a
witness in any judicial, administrative, or legislative proceeding, or to petition
any legislature or to communicate with any legislator: Provided, That any such
member may be required to exhaust reasonable hearing procedures (but not to exceed a four-month lapse of time) within such organization, before instituting legal or administrative proceedings against such organizations or any officer
thereof: And provided further, That no interested employer or employer association shall directly or indirectly finance, encourage, or participate in, except as a
party, any such action, proceeding, appearance, or petition.
29 U.S.C. § 411(a) (4) (1971).
20. Sections 101(a)(5) and 101(b) provide:
SAFEGUARDS AGAINST IMPROPER DISCIPLINARY ACTION-No member of any labor organization may be fined, suspended, expelled, or otherwise discipined except for nonpayment of dues by such organization or by any officer
thereof unless such member has been (A) served with written specific charges;
(B) given a reasonable time to prepare his defense; (C) afforded a full and fair
hearing.
(b) Any provision of the constitution and bylaws of any labor organization
which is inconsistent with the provisions of this section shall be of no force or
effect.
29 U.S.C. §§ 411(a) (5), 101(b) (1971).
21. 29 U.S.C. § 412 (1971).
22. Id. (emphasis added). Senator Kuchel of California wrote the amendment which
with some modification, including the words "including injunctions," subsequently became the basis for section 102. See 2 NLRB, LEGIsLATI
I-HIsToRY OF ThE LABoRMANAGEMENT REPORTiNG AND DIscLosURE AcT OF 1959, at 1232 (1959) [hereinafter
cited as LEGISLATIVE HISTORY].

23. 29 U.S.C. H8 461-66 (1971).

24. Id. § 464.

140
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labor organization for such relief (including injunctions) as may be
25
appropriate.
The question of whether or not the general and vague criterion of

"appropriate" relief authorizes the recovery of attorney's fees was answered in the negative by early decisions 26 which purported to rely on
the legislative history of the LMRDA. Vars v. International Brotherhood of Boilermakers,2 7 the first case to rule on the propriety of at-

torney's fees under section 102,28 involved a union member who was
unlawfully expelled from union membership for allegedly violating a
union bylaw which forbade the discussion of religious matters during
union meetings.29 Although the union member successfully established
a violation of section 101(a)(2), 30 a Connecticut federal district court
refused to award attorney's fees and held that Congress had intentionally excluded such a remedy in Title I litigation. 1 The court was persuaded by a House Minority Report which had urged that attorney's
fees be specifically authorized in all successful actions involving substantive rights created by the LMRDA.32
One of the most serious inadequacies of the Senate Bill is the lack of
any effective enforcement procedure to protect union members from
those few union officials who fail to recognize that a union belongs
to its members. Under that bill, the individual member must shoulder
25. Id. § 464(a) (emphasis added). Section 301 discusses the procedures of drafting reports pursuant to the establishment of a trusteeship over a subordinate labor
organization. Id. § 461(a).
26. See, e.g., Cole v. Hall, 35 F.R.D. 4, 8 (E.D.N.Y. 1964), af 'd on other grounds,
and remanded for trial, 339 F.2d 881 (2d Cir. 1965), 66 CCH Lab. Cas. I 22,011
(E.D.N.Y. 1971), ajf'd, 462 F.2d 777 (2d Cir. 1972), afj'd, 412 U.S. 1 (1973);
McCraw v. United Ass'n of Journeymen & Apprentices of Plumbing, 341 F.2d 705,
710 (6th Cir. 1965); Jacques v. Local 1418, Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n, 246 F. Supp.
857, 860 (E.D. La. 1965); Magelsson v. Local 518, Operative Plasterers' & Cement
Masons' Int'l Ass'n, 240 F. Supp. 259, 263 (W.D. Mo. 1965); Leonard v. M.I.T.
Employees' Union, 225 F. Supp. 937, 940 (D. Mass. 1964); Vars v. International Bhd.
of Boilermakers, 215 F. Supp. 943, 952 (D. Conn. 1963), af 'd on other grounds,
320 F.2d 576 (2d Cir. 1963).
27. 215 F. Supp. 943, 952 (D. Conn.), aff'd on other grounds, 320 F.2d 576
(2d Cir. 1963).
28. 29 U.S.C. § 412 (1971), quoted in text accompanying note 18 supra.
29. 215 F. Supp. at 945.
30. 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(2) (1971), quoted in note 16 supra.
31. 215 F. Supp. at 952.
32. H.R. REP. No. 741, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 95 (1959). Nine of the members
of the House Committee on Education and Labor opposed the Elliott Bill (HR 8,342)
which contained the same language pertaining to relief as found in section 102 of Title
I of the Landrum-Griffin Bill (HR 8,400) which was eventually passed by the House.
See Gartner v. Soloner, 384 F.2d 348, 351-52 n.5 (3d Cir. 1967), aff'g in part, rev'g
in part,220 F. Supp. 115 (E.D. Pa. 1963), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1040 (1967).
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the burden of litigation costs himself.

The union officer [sic], on the

other hand, have the entire resources of the union at their disposal. . ... 3
Despite the House Minority Report, a provision explicitly authorizing recovery of fees was not included in Title I of the Act as passed, 4
although fee recoveries were explicitly authorized for violations of Titles
11 and V.3 5 The court, therefore, determined that Congress had intended
to make available an award of attorney's fees only where expressly

stated.3 6
In McGraw v. United Association of Journeymen & Apprentices of
Plumbing,17 a Tennessee federal district court also relied on the appar-

ent congressional refusal in order to deny a successful union member
reasonable attorney's fees.38 The suit involved a wage earner who was
illegally fined and later suspended from the union for refusing to pay

that fine. 39 The court referred to the legislative testimony of Senator
Goldwater who had commented:
Although the bill permits the union member himself to sue for infringement of his rights, the nature of the suit is such as to promise, even if
successful, little in the way of monetary damages except in the rare
case where the plaintiff's job rights or job tenure have been adversely
affected. Moreover, the bill does not grant him, even where successful
in his suit, reasonable counsel fees or other costs. 40

Following Vars and McGraw,41 a New York federal district court

also denied recovery of attorney's fees. 41

Since Congress had spe-

33. LEGisLATrv HIsToRY, supra note 22, at 2492, quoted in Gartner, 384 F.2d at
350.
34. 29 U.S.C. § 412 (1971), quoted in text accompanying note 18 supra.
35. See note 43 infra.
36. 215 F. Supp. at 952. See note 43 infra.
37. 216 F. Supp. 655 (E.D. Tenn. 1963), aff'd, 341 F.2d 705 (6th Cir. 1965).
38. Id. at 710-11.
39. Id. at 707-09. The union unsuccessfully alleged that the union member had
filed a discrimination charge with the National Labor Relations Board without first
exhausting his remedies within the local and international unions and that this constituted grounds for his suspension from the union. Id. at 711.
40. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 22, at 1281, quoted in 216 F. Supp. at 664
n.3. The court was persuaded by the remarks of Senator Goldwater which were not
expressed as part of a floor debate on the Act in the Senate, but rather as testimony
before the Committee on Education and Labor of the House of Representatives on June
3, 1959, and printed in the Congressional Record without objection at the suggestion
of Senator Goldwater.
41. See text accompanying notes 27-40 supra.
42. Cole v. Hall, 35 F.R.D. 4 (E.D.N.Y. 1964), ajf'd on other grounds and remanded
for trial, 339 F.2d 881 (2d Cir. 1965), 66 CCH Lab. Cas. I 22,011 (E.D.N.Y. 1971),
aff'd, 462 F.2d 777 (2d Cir. 1972), affl'd, 412 U.S. 1 (1973).
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cifically provided for such a remedy in Titles I and V of the LMRDA,4 3
the court believed that if Congress had intended to include such relief
in all titles of the Act, it would expressly have done so.44 Absent such
express language in section 102, the court found a deliberate congressional intent to omit the award of attorney's fees from Title I litigation. 45
Thus a line of federal cases transformed congressional silence into
an absolute prohibition against the award of attorney's fees in Title I
actions. What these courts failed to recognize was that most of the enforcement sections were finally added to the LMRDA as congressional floor compromises and were not subjected to intensive prior
committee deliberation. 46 This explains in part the sparsity of affirmative statements by those members of Congress in favor of granting attorney's fees.47 The affirmative responses actually expressed
by the sponsors of the Act conveyed the notion that the language was
purposely written broadly to give the courts "wide latitude to grant relief according to the necessitites of the case,"48 to cover any loss suffered by a union member. 49 In fact, there is no suggestion in the legislative history of the Act that any member of Congress was opposed
to the remedy of attorney's fees.5" The only conflict was whether or
not specific statutory language was necessary to express such a con43. Section 201(c) provides for the award of attorney's fees in a suit brought by
a union member who obtains access to union books, records and accounts to verify
annual financial statements. 'The court in such action may, in its discretion, in
addition to any judgment awarded to the plaintiff or plaintiffs, allow a reasonable
attorney's fee to be paid by the defendant, and costs of the action." 29 U.S.C.
§ 431(c) (1971). Section 501(b) authorizes the award of attorney's fees in a suit
brought by a union member against a union official to recover damages or for an
accounting for the benefit of the union on the premise that the union official is violating his duties.
The trial judge may allot a reasonable part of the recovery in any action under
this subsection to pay the fees of counsel prosecuting the suit at the instance of
the member of the labor organization and to compensate such member for any expenses necessarily paid or incurred by him in connection with the litigation.
29 U.S.C. § 501(b) (1971).
44. 35 F.R.D. at 8.
45. Id.
46. See Cole v. Hall, 66 CCH Lab. Cas. 22,011, at 22,013, 22,015 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
See also Cox, Internal Affairs of Labor Unions Under the Labor Reform Act of 1959,
58 MIcH. L. Rnv. 819, 852 (1960).
47. 66 CCH Lab. Cas. at 22,015.
48. 105 CONG. Ruc. 15547-48 (1959) (remarks of Representative Elliott), quoted in
384 F.2d at 352-53 and in LEGIsLATrvE HSTORY, supra note 22, at 1584.

74 infra and Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1 (1973).
49. 412.U.S. at 11.
50. Id. at 12-13.

See note
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gressional intent.51
The first decision to controvert the early cases5" which had relied on
the legislative history of the Act for support in denying attorney's fees
under the LMRDA53 was the Third Circuit decision in Gartner v.
Soloner."4 The case involved a union member who was fined and
suspended from union membership for protesting a denial of voting
rights to other union members.VP In finding the remedy of attorney's
fees permissible in Title I litigation, the court concluded that Congress
has neither expressly limited nor narrowly defined the scope of recovery
available under section 102.56 The court maintained that Congress
had been aware that if remedies such as attorney's fees were specifically spelled out in the enforcement provision, the "danger that those
[other remedies] not listed might be proscribed

. .

. [would] result

[in] the courts be[ing] fettered in their efforts to grant relief according
to the necessities of the case."'5 7 Although the court concurred with

the earlier decisions which had discerned a congressional reluctance to
specifically enumerate the right to attorney's fees in circumstances
where a union member resisted the deprivation of rights guaranteed by
Title 1,58 Gartnerreasoned that such a remedy was in no way precluded
by the purposely general and vague words "appropriate relief." 59 The
court declared:
That phrase, while it avoided spotlighting the making available of necessary material assistance to a single unionist fighting his lonely battle
for justice, did take care of the situation by means of the deliberately
general language used. . . . [I]f the Congress had concluded to reverse
its field . . . , it would have stated that there would be no counsel fees

allowed. Absent this, "appropriate relief" fairly construed must be
held to include proper counsel fees. 60
Gartner dismissed prior contrary decisions as being "too readily
and too strongly [relied upon]

. . .

for the proposition that the

courts are without power to grant counsel fees under Section 102. ' 61
51. Gartner v. Soloner, 384 F.2d 348, 352 (3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S.
1040 (1968).
52. See cases cited in note 26 supra.
53. Id.
54. 384 F.2d at 351-56.
55. Id. at 348-49.
56. Id. at 353. 29 U.S.C. § 412 (1971), quoted in text accompanying note 18 supra.
57. 384 F.2d at 353.
58. Id. at 355.

59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 353.

The court also felt that Vars was not, in fact, meant to be too
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The court also emphasized that Titles I (section 201 (c)) and V (section 501(b)) of the Act,62 which expressly authorize the award of
attorney's fees, in no way control the interpretation of other titles of

the Act, nor do they justify the hypothesis that the LMRDA statutorily
denies the award of fees in Title I litigation.63
The Third Circuit also found it appropriate to distinguish the Supreme Court holding of Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing
Co.,0 4 a decision which had denied attorney's fees to a respondent who

successfully alleged a patent trademark infringement.65 Pointing out
that Congress had limited and meticulously detailed the available remedies to a litigant who successfully sues under the Lanham Act,00 the
Court in Fleischmannhad stated:
When a cause of action has been created by statute which expressly
provides the remedies for vindication of the cause, other remedies
should not be readily implied . . . . A judicially created compensatory
remedy in addition to the express statutory remedies is inappropriate in
6
this context. 7

Gartner emphasized that the language of section 102 was not as restrictive as that found in the Lanham Act and thus could not prevent
restrictive in that the case seemed to indicate that exemplary damages might include
the recovery of attorney's fees where the union's action was motivated by willful malice. Id.
62. 29 U.S.C. §§ 431(c), 501(b) (1971). See statutes quoted in note 43 supra.
63. 384 F.2d at 353. The court said that, in attempting to extract the legislative
purpose, primary concern should always be given to the views expressed by the sponsors of the legislation and that in this respect the statements of Senator McClellan and
Representative Elliott should be viewed as representing the true spirit of section 102.
See note 74 infra.
64. 386 U.S. 714 (1967), discussed in 384 F.2d at 353-54.
65. 386 U.S at 721.
66. Id. at 719. In the Lanham Act, Congress meticulously details the remedies
available to a plaintiff who can prove that his valid trademark has been infringed.
The statute provides not only for injunctive relief, but also for compensatory recovery,
measured by the profits accrued to the defendant by virtue of his infringement,
costs of litigation, and other damages as may be appropriate under the circumstances.
15 U.S.C. §§ 1116-17 (1971). The Court pointed out that it has long been established that attorney's fees are not usually granted in the absence of a statute or
enforceable contract and that exceptions to the rule were not developed in the context of statutory causes of action for which the legislature had prescribed intricate
remedies. 386 U.S. at 717, 719.
67. 386 U.S. at 720-21. The Court had also stated that if plaintiff's argument that
"costs" (for which recovery was statutorily provided) included attorney's fees were accepted, it "would require us to ascribe to Congress a purpose to vary the meaning of
that term without either statutory language or legislative history to support the unusual
construction." Id. at 720.
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a union member from successfully seeking a judicially created remedy

in addition to the express statutory remedies which the Act did provide."

The earlier cases had maintained that either statutory language

or explicit legislative history was required to authorize an award of attorney's fees. However, Gartnerrecognized that there was no express
or implied Congressional purpose in the LMRDA to restrict the inherent equity powers of the federal courts 69 and that the mere absence of
statutory authorization would not revoke a court's inherent ability to

grant fees in appropriate circumstances. 7 0

Gartner construed the

LMRDA to permit an award of attorney's fees when equity would re-

quire it, since statutory language or a congressional intent disallowing
71
such relief was entirely absent.
The Third Circuit thus assumed the role of arbiter of both legal

and equitable relief by granting the successful union member reasonable attorney's fees. 72 Stressing congressional approval, the court concluded that, given the court's legal and equitable jurisdiction, "[tlhe
scope of authority under Section 102 and the flexibility with which that

power may be exercised is practically unlimited ....

,73

Section 102

was designed to be enforced by union members aided by the court's
wide latitude "to grant relief . . . as it deemed equitable under all the
'74
circumstances.
68. 384 F.2d at 354.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 355. Gilbert v. Local 701, Hoisting & Portable Eng'rs, 390 P.2d 320
(Ore. 1964), was the first state court case in union-member litigation to award attorney's fees where the award was not statutorily enumerated. The case dealt with
litigation where there already existed state procedures by which a union member could
enforce fiduciary duties of union officers. Id. at 320-21. The court announced:
If those who wish to preserve the internal democracy of the union are required
to pay out of their own pockets the cost of employing counsel, they are not apt
to take legal action to correct the abuse. The elimination of improper practices
in union affairs benefits not only the [member] who initiates the suit, but also
inures to the members of the union and the public as well. The cost of employing
counsel should not be visited upon the persons who bring the suit and prevail.
. . . No obstacles should be placed in the path of union members who, acting
in good faith, seek the aid of the courts in an effort to correct abuses of power by
union officials.
Id. at 321.
71. 384 F.2d at 353.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 354.
74. 105 CONo. REc. 6717 (1959) (remarks of Senator Kuchel). See LEaisLATrvE
HIsTORY, supra note 22, at 1233 (remarks of Senator Clark commenting on Senator
Kuchel's proposal that section 102 "takes the Federal bureaucracy out of this bill of
rights and leaves its enforcement to union members, aided by the courts."). Senator
McClellan, the author of Title I, reiterated Senator Clark's remarks in a supplement
to his own testimony before the House Education and Labor Committee, LEGisLATrvE
HISTORY, supra note 22, at 1294; Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 13. (1973); 29 U.S.C. §§
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The court noted the development of limited court-developed exceptions to the conservative American rule75 that attorney's fees are not
ordinarily recoverable in the absence of explicit statutory language-"
One such exception applies when a plaintiffs suit results in a substantial benefit to members of an ascertainable class. 77 Awarding attorney's fees is justifiable in these cases because equitable considerations
require that those who profit or benefit from plaintiff's successful
litigation should share the expense incurred by plaintiff in bringing the
suit.7 8 It has been concluded that the easiest and most logical way to
413, 523(a) (1971). See also the remarks of Representative Elliott who said, "[Tihe
court's jurisdiction . . . 'to grant such other and further relief as may be appropriate'
gives it a wide latitude to grant relief according to the necessities of the case." LEGISLATVE HISTORY, supra note 22, at 1584; note 48 supra; and the remarks of Representative O'Hara of Michigan who stated:
These rights [in Title I] are enforced effectively and fairly by civil actions in the
Federal courts. In such suit the court can award money damages to compensate
any loss suffered by a member through denial of any of the enumerated rights and
can enjoin any repetition of actions which deprive the member of his rights.
LEGisA-n
ISTORY, supranote 22, at 1632 (emphasis added).
75. 384 F.2d at 354-55. See, e.g., Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375
(1970); Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S 714 (1967);
Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'l Bank, 307 U.S. 161 (1939).
76. Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 717, cited in
384 F.2d at 354. The American rule is more conservative and restrictive than the
fee-shifting rules adopted in most countries and a broad revision of the American rule
has been widely advocated. See, e.g., Ehrenzweig, Reimbursement of Counsel Fees and
the Great Society, 54 CALiF. L. Ruv. 792 (1966); Stoebuck, Counsel Fees Included in
Costs: A Logical Development, 38 CoLo. L. Rnv. 202 (1966); Comment, Attorneys'
Fees in Shareholder Derivative Suits: The Substantial Benefit Rule Reexamined, 60
CALE. L. Rv. 164 (1972); Comment, Allowance of Attorneys' Fees in Civil Rights
Actions, 7 COLUM. J.L. Soc. PROB. 381 (1971); Comment, The Allocation of Attorney's
Fees After Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 38 U. Cm. L. REv. 316 (1971); Comment,
Counsel Fees in Stockholders' Derivative and Class Actions-Hornstein Revisited, 6 U.
RicHmoND LJ. 259 (1972); Comment, Attorneys' Fees: What Constitutes a "Benefit"
Sufficient to Award Fees From Third Party Beneficiaries, 1972 WASH. U.L.Q. 271.
Statutes which expressly provide for the recovery of attorney's fees include the
Clayton Act, § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1971); Communications Act of 1934, § 206,
47 U.S.C. § 206 (1971); Interstate Commerce Act, § 16, 49 U.S.C. § 16(2) (1971);
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 9(e), 18(a), 15 U.S.C. H9 78i(e), 78r(a) (1971).
77. Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 396 (1970). A substantial benefit
is "one that accomplishes a result which corrects or prevents an abuse which would
be prejudicial to the rights and interests of the corporation or affect the enjoyment
or protection of an essential right to the stockholder's interest." Bosch v. Meeker Cooperative Light & Power Ass'n, 101 N.W.2d 423, 426-27 (Minn. 1960). For a discussion of the substantial benefit rule in a union context, see text accompanying notes
129-52 infra. Another situation in which courts have ordered a litigant to pay the
attorney's fees of his mccessful opponent exists when a suit has been filed and litigated "in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons." 6 J. MooRE,
MmnAL PRcrrcE 1352 (1966).
See also Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc.,
390 U.S. 400, 402 n4 (1968).
78. See 396 U.S. at 392-94.
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avoid the unjust enrichment of those benefited is to make them contribute equally to the litigation expenses. 79
It was the Supreme Court decision of Sprague v. Ticonic National
Bank"' which formulated the American rule that the "allowance of such
costs in appropriate situations is part of the historic equity jurisdiction
of the federal courts.""' Sprague involved a successful litigant who had
vindicated her rights to a trust fund. Although she had never even
purported to sue on behalf of a class,82 the Court recognized that her
successful suit would by stare decisis83 entitle fourteen other persons
similarly situated to recover from the same fund.8 4 Advocating that
"[i]ndividualization in the exercises of a discretionary power will alone
retain equity as a living system and save it from sterility,"8 15 the Court
ordered that the non-parties to the suit contribute to plaintiffs litigation
86
costs out of the assets from which their recovery would also accrue.
Thus the Gartnercourt, relying on the historic precedent of Sprague,
merely acknowledged what it perceived to be its already existent equitable power8" and exercised it in the way which it felt would best serve
the interests of justice. 8 The court found "appropriate" an equitable award of attorney's fees to a union member who successfully pursued his substantive rights under the LMRDA in a good-faith private
suit enforcing the duties and responsibilities of those guilty of abuse. 9
This justified its departure from the traditional judicial custom in the
United States of not awarding attorney's fees to a successful plaintiff.9"
79. Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 387, 409 (N.D. Ala. 1972).
80. Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'l Bank, 307 U.S. 161 (1939).
81. Id. at 164-65.
82. Id. at 166.
83. Id. at 167.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 170.
87. 384 F.2d at 354.
88. Id. at 356.
89. Id. at 355. The court said that, in construing the statute, "the court must consider the purpose of its enactment, the evil to be eradicated, the object to be obtained,
and recognize the construction that would best effectuate those standards." Id.
90. Id. See note 76 supra. Opponents to fee-shifting argue that the evil to be eradicated does not merit the remedy urged. It is their contention that the award of
attorney's fees in the occasionally successful and meritorious case will not be worth
the litigation. Summers, The Law of Union Discipline: What the Courts Do in Fact,
70 YALE LJ. 175, 222 (1960). Since most litigation involves not solely individual
efforts but intra-union political faction power struggles, the burden of litigation costs
is lightened by the pooling of finances of these opposition groups. But, "Etihe very
fact that so few cases involve individuals unsupported by factional groups suggests that
the lone member's rights go by default." Id. The availability of factional support
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Prompted by the fact "[t~hat stark reality might slam the door in
[the] litigant's face when confronted with the insurmountable obstacle
of prohibitive legal expenses," 91 Gartner was the first case to conclude

that a denial of attorney's fees in Title I litigation would virtually close
a wage earner's access to the federal judicial system when his rights had
been infringed by his union. It recognized the inequality of resources
between an individual union member who shoulders the burden of litigation costs himself and a union officer who commands the entire treasury of the organization. 9"[lit is untenable to assert that in establishing the bill of rights under
the Act Congress intended to have those rights diminished by the [inescapable] fact that an aggrieved union member would be unable to fi93
nance litigation ....
Further, a union has less incentive to extend and complicate the litigation through costly procedural devices and appeals to the point where

the struggle becomes inherently unequal and the financial burden impossible for the rank-and-file union member if successful individual
litigants will be granted attorney's fees. More importantly, when
seeking an injunction or reinstatement to the union under section 102, °4
an award of attorney's fees encourages individuals to engage in the risks
of litigation and to vindicate congressional statutory policy by deterring
future acts of union management mistreatment95 although the financial stake in the outcome may be relatively small.9 6 Since most wage
"should not conceal the obvious necessity for requiring a guilty union to indemnify
a lone member who is forced into litigation to protect his guaranteed rights." Counsel
Fees, supra note 10, at 580.

91. 384 F.2d at 355.
92. Id.
93. Id.

94. 29 U.S.C. § 412 (1971), quoted in text accompanying note 18 supra.
95. See text accompanying notes 89-94 supra.
96. This situation exists because, although monetary damages may be available to
the wage earner who can substantiate bad faith or malice on the part of union management, in most cases either there will be no bad faith to demonstrate or damages
will be difficult to prove. If a union member were awarded substantial monetary damages, the court would probably deny the additional remedy of attorney's fees since such
an additional award, if granted, might well destroy any therapeutic value through depletion of union funds to such an extent as "might impair the union's ability to operate
as an effective collective bargaining agent ....

."

412 U.S. at 15 n.13. Thus, if the

damages award were sizable, but would not itself impair the union's ability to operate
effectively, the union's financial capabilities, in light of the award, would still be
a proper subject for consideration by the trial court in a subsequent exercise of its
discretion as to what recovery of attorney's fees, if any, the union member would be
entitled. See text accompanying notes 170-71 infra. In any event, courts will not
award attorney's fees for that portion of the union member's effort which conferred
special benefits upon himself over and above that conferred on the union and its other
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earners are hesitant to incur great expense in order to vindicate intangible rights,97 the potential remedy of attorney's fees would ease the initial reluctance to sue.
The court was also sensitive to the fact that an attorney contemplating whether or not to represent a union member might well deem
such litigation a poor risk and refuse the case if the individual's assets
constituted the only potential source for his fee.98 The assurance that
attorneys will be reimbursed for their legal services upon the success
of the lawsuit would thus increase private enforcement of the Act.9 9
The enforcement provision of Title IV 100 of the Act is not only silent on the question of attorney's fees, but also lacks the language
"[s]uch relief (including injunctions) as may be appropriate" which
had been held to justify the grant of attorney's fees in Gartner. Nevertheless, in Yablonski v. United Mine Workers of America,"'0 the Dis-

trict of Columbia Court of Appeals extended the reasoning of Gartner
to Title IV by granting attorney's fees to a successful union member
who had exposed union election abuses by private suit.10
members. Dillon v. Berg, 351 F. Supp. 584, 588 (D. Del. 1972), discussing Mills
and citing Kahan v. Rosenstiel, 424 F.2d 161, 166 (3d Cir. 1970). See text accompanying note 109 infra.
97. 105 CONG. REc. 10094, 10095 (1959) (remarks of Senator Goldwater).
98. See Summers, The Law of Union Discipline: What the Courts Do in Fact, 70
YAr.E LJ. 175, 221 (1960).
99. See text accompanying notes 158-65 infra.
100. Section 402(b) reads:
The Secretary of Labor shall investigate such complaint and, if he finds probable
cause to believe that a violation of this subchapter has occurred and has not been
remedied, he shall, within 60 days after the filing of such complaint, bring a
civil action against the labor organization as an entity in the district court of the
United States in which such labor organization maintains its principal office to set
aside the invalid election, if any, and to direct the conduct of an election or hearing and vote upon the removal of officers under the supervision of the Secretary
and in accordance with the provisions of this subchapter and such rules and regulations as the Secretary may prescribe. The court shall have power to take such
action as it deems proper to preserve the assets of the labor organization.
29 U.S.C. § 482(b) (1971).
101. 466 F.2d 424 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 918 (1973).
102. 29 U.S.C. § 481 (1971). Although Title IV only discusses the judicial enforcement of election violations by the Secretary of Labor, Trbovich v. United Mine Workers of America, 404 U.S. 528 (1972), held that a suit by the Secretary was not the
exclusive post-election remedy for a violation of the title. The Court held that no
bar was imposed to intervention by a union member, provided the intervention is limited to the claims of illegality originally presented by the Secretary of Labor. Since
the union has already been summoned into court to defend the legality of the election
and the union member is not initiating a new cause of action, his joinder in the lawsuit
subjects the union to little additional burden. Id. at 530-37. Relying on the holding
of Trbovich, Yablonski had intervened in a suit initially filed by the Secretary of Labor.
466 F.2d at 426.
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Similarly qualifying Fleischmann'0 3 as not involving a suit where
the burdens of litigation were carried by an individual for the benefit
of a larger class, 10 4 Yablonski determined that the wage earner was not
vindicating his own rights alone, but those of every union member
as well, since the election violations affected every union member at
least in a general way. 05 The successful Title IV suit therefore conferred a benefit on the union and its other members in a way similar to
that in Gartner.06 "The relevant question is whether or not the trouble
[plaintiff] takes results in the actual conferring of benefits on others
than himself.' 07 The Yablonski court concluded that the exposure

of an election violation conferred a benefit on the union and its members substantial enough to merit the awarding of attorney's fees.' 08
Although conceding that the primary motive of the plaintiff was to aid
his own election candidacy, the court still found the situation appropriate for an award of fees, since, in all litigation of this nature, the plaintiff is pursuing his own interests as well as those of others. 10 Indeed,

if defeated candidates did not initiate lawsuits exposing election violations, it is difficult to determine who would.
Agreeing with Gartner that the absence of explicit statutory authori-

zation does not nullify the power of a federal court to grant attorney's
fees,"10 the Yablonski court was motivated by the belief that it is often
103. See text accompanying notes 64-67 supra.
104. 466 F.2d at 429.
105. Id. at 431.
106. Id. at 430-31, discussing Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 39296 (1970).
107. 466 F.2d at 431.
108. Id. Since the actions taken by the union were political reprisals designed to
undermine the rights of the litigating union member, the political slate he supported,
and its supporters, "appropriate relief" included an award of attorney's fees because of
the indirect benefit to the union and its members as a whole. The indirect benefit
was Yablonski's judicial promotion of fair election practices. See also Cefalo v. United
Mine Workers of America, 311 F. Supp. 946, 955 (E.D. La. 1970).
109. 466 F.2d at 430-3 1.
110. Id. at 429-30. The court felt that Senator Goldwater's testimony regarding section 102 "hardly amounts to a definitive and absolute setting of congressional intent
against the giving of such incidental relief by the courts where compatible with sound
and established equitable principles." See text accompanying note 34 supra. Other
federal cases following the trend that a court has the discretionary power to award
attorney's fees to a successful union member include: Nix v. International Ass'n of
Machinists & Aerospace Workers, 479 F.2d 382, 386-87 (5th Cir. 1973); Kerr v. Screen
Extras Guild, Inc., 466 F.2d 1267, 1270 (9th Cir. 1972); Semancik v. United Mine
Workers of America, 466 F.2d 144, 155-56 (3d Cir. 1972); Burch v. International Ass'n
of Machinists, 454 F.2d 1170, 1171 (5th Cir. 1971); Robins v. Schonfeld, 326 F. Supp.
525, 531 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Cefalo v. United Mine Workers of America, 311 F. Supp.
946, 955 (E.D. La. 1970); Local 2, International Bhd. of Tel. Workers v. International

19741

ATTORNEY'S FEES

necessary to grant a judicial remedy to give legislation its intended function.
It seems to us most unlikely that the Congressional perceptions of the
needs for greater democracy and fair dealing in internal union affairs,
which sparked the passage of the LMRDA, did not extend as well to
the vital role of the equity powers of the judiciary in meeting those
11
needs. '
By thus granting attorney's fees, the court used its equitable powers

to spread the cost of implementing the congressional policy of preserving and advancing internal union democracy among the union's mem12
bers.1

In Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co.," 3 the United States Supreme
Court announced a decision which, although it did not involve a

LMRDA action, contained principles similar to those in Gartner and
Yablonski. Indeed in Mills, the Court extended the circumstances in

which the award of attorney's fees is "appropriate" to situations where
the "suit has not . . . produced, and may never produce, a monetary
recovery from which the fees could be paid."" 4 This was expansive

language since the prior rationale, stemming from Sprague," 5 had
never clearly discussed the nature or the potential adequacy of a non16

pecuniary benefit1
Mills involved a lawsuit to set aside a merger initiated by minority
shareholders both derivatively on behalf of the corporation and as rep-

resentatives of the class of minority shareholders.

The corporation

had mailed an illegal management proxy statement to all shareholders
in violation of rule 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act.1"T The
Bhd. of Tel. Workers, 295 F. Supp. 1178, 1180 (C.D. Mass. 1969); Sands v. Abelli,
290 F. Supp. 677 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); cf. White v. King, 319 F. Supp. 122 (E.D. La.
1970).
111. 466 F.2d at 429.
112. Id. at 431.
113. 396 U.S. 375, 389-97 (1970).
114. Id. at 392. Mills extended the rationale of Sprague (supra notes 75-81) to litigation "which corrects or prevents an abuse which would be prejudicial to the rights
and interests" of others. Id. at 396, quoting Bosch v. Meeker Cooperative Light &
Power Ass'n, 101 N.W.2d 423 (Minn. 1969). Bosch involved a stockholder who was
reimbursed for his expenses in successfully obtaining a judicial declaration that a corporate directors' election was invalid. The court awarded attorney's fees even though
no monetary fund was created, cautioning only that the benefit must be "substantial."
Id. at 427.
115. See text accompanying notes 80-86 supra.
116. Id.
117. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1971). Rule 14(a) is silent on the question of attorney's
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Court first distinguished the remedial provisions of the Securities Exchange Act from all-inclusive provisions such as those of the Lanham
8 Interpreting a congressional silence
Act dealt with in Fleischmann."1
similar to that involved in Titles I and IV of the LMRDA as a tacit
authorization, rather than a prohibition, of attorney's fees, 11 the
Court announced:
While the general American rule is that attorneys' fees are not ordinarily
recoverable as costs, both the courts and Congress have developed exceptions to this rule for situations in which overriding considerations
indicate the need for such a recovery. A primary judge-created exception has been to award expenses where a plaintiff has successfully
maintained a suit, usually on behalf of a class, that2°[substantially]
benefits a group of others in the same manner as himself.1
The "substantial benefit" conferred in Mills was the plaintiffs' pri-

vate effectuation of the congressional goal of a "fair and informed
corporate suffrage' 2 ' within the national policy against securities violations. This non-monetary benefit, one involving "corporate therapeutics,"1 2 was believed by the Court to be "substantial" in that it
provided all shareholders an 2important
means of exposing and prevent3
ing management misconduct.
fees although Rules 9(e) and 18(a) specifically provide for the remedy of attorney's
fees.
118. 396 U.S. at 391. 15 U.S.C. § 1117 (1971).
119. 396 U.S. at 390-97.
120. Id. at 391-92 (emphasis added and footnote omitted). The Court said that
"[t]o allow the others to obtain full benefit from the plaintiffs efforts without contributing equally to the litigation expenses would be to enrich the others unjustly at
the plaintiff's expense." Id. at 392.
121. Id. at 396. "[T]he stress placed by Congress on the importance of fair and informed corporate suffrage leads to the conclusion that, in vindicating the statutory
policy, petitioners have rendered a substantial service to the corporation and its shareholders." Id. See also Lee v. Southern Home Sites, 444 F.2d 143, 145 (5th
Cir. 1971), which held, in discussing Mills, that attorney's fees are a "court-created
remedy justified as necessary to further the 'corporate therapeutics' called for in Congress' strong policy favoring fair and informed corporate suffrage." See note 122 inIra.
122. 396 U.S. at 396.

See Hornstein, Legal Therapeutics: The "Salvage" Factor

in Counsel Fee Awards, 69 HAnv. L. REV. 658 (1956). Hornstein advocated that in
a derivative suit, "[e]ffective enforcement mandated the shifting of attorneys' fees to
the successful plaintiff as a necessary concomitant . . . which is vital to the exposure

and redress of corporate abuse." Id. at 816. Hornstein described the problem as
David v. Goliath, with David unable to afford the slingshot. Id. at 791. He labeled
the remedy of fee-shifting to promote fair conduct in the corporate world "legal or
corporate therapeutics."
123. 396 U.S. at 396. Sin v. Amos, 340 F. Supp. 691, 694-95 (M.D. Ala. 1972),
discussing Lee v. Southern-Home Sites, 444 F.2d 143 (5th Cir. 1971), note 116 supra,
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In essence, Mills suggests that the conditions prerequisite to an award
of attorney's fees in the corporate context are satisfied when a securities act violation is discovered and a means of enforcement provided. 124
Thus, those who establish a violation of the securities laws by their corporation or its officers, according to Mills, should be reimbursed for
their costs in so doing. 2 '
Intent on distributing litigation costs proportionately among those
who benefited from the suit, Mills stressed that an award of litigation
costs was not an additional penalty against the wrongdoers. 2 ' The
Court explained:
[T]he expenses incurred by one shareholder in the vindication of a corporate right of action can be spread among all shareholders through an
award against the corporation, regardless of whether an actual monetary recovery has been obtained ....127
. . .To award attorneys' fees . . . is not to saddle the unsuccess-

ful party with the expenses but to impose them on the class that has
and that which would have had to pay them had
benefited from them 128
they brought the suit.

Whether or not th& expansive "substantial benefit" requirement of
corporate suits was to apply in litigation brought to enforce the provisions of the LMRDA was finally and authoritatively decided in the
1973 United States Supreme Court decision of Hall v. Cole.129 The
Court in Hall expanded the language of "appropriate relief' in section
102180 by awarding attorney's fees, within the discretion of the court,
which stated that "the award of [attorney's fees] . . .becomes a part of the effective
remedy a court should fashion to encourage public-minded suits and to carry out congressional policy ... and it is of no consequence that the statute under which plaintiffs filed this suit is silent on the availability of attorneys' fees." Id. at 145.
124. 396 U.S. at 396. See, e.g., deHass v. Empire Petroleum Co., 435 F.2d 1223,
1231 (10th Cir. 1970). See also Walker v. CBS, Inc., 443 F.2d 33 (7th Cir. 1971),
which held, in discussing Mills, that plaintiff's action "involved corporate therapeutics
and furnished a benefit to all shareholders by providing an important means of enforcement of the proxy statute." Id. at 36.
125. 396 U.S. at 396. See also Lee v. Southern Home Sites, 444 F.2d at 145, which
noted, in commenting upon Mills, that "[tihose who establish a violation of the securities laws by the corporation and its officials should be reimbursed by their corporation for the costs of establishing the violation, including attorneys' fees."
126. 396 U.S. at 396-97.
127. Id. at 394.
128. Id. at 396-97. Justice Black dissented, stating that "[i]f there is a need for
the recovery of attorneys' fees to effectuate the policies of the Act here involved, that
need should. . . be met by Congress, not by this Court." Id. at 397.
129. 412 U.S. 1 (1973).
130. 29 U.S.C. § 412 (1971), quoted in text accompanying note 18 supra.
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whenever "[o]verriding considerations indicate the need for such re-

covery."'131 The respondent in Hall had been expelled from the union
for condemning union management practices as being undemocratic
and shortsighted.' 3 2

The union contended that the wage earner's ac-

tions had constituted malicious vilification which justified his expulsion
from the union. The district court 13 3 and the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit,13 however, ruled that-the union member had been unlawfully expelled from the union for exercising his right to free speech

guaranteed by section 101(a)(2) of the Act 3 " and ordered his permanent reinstatement to union membership. Additionally, the courts
sustained his motion for attorney's fees in the sum of $15,500 against

the defendant union.

36

Limiting its review on appeal solely to the

question of the propriety of the award of attorney's fees, the Supreme
Court affirmed the lower federal courts' rulings by granting the suc-

cessful union member his litigation expenses.'1

7

The Court rejected petitioner's argument that, since an award of fees

was specifically authorized in Titles H-and V of the LMRDA, 8" Congress intended that recovery of fees be excluded from actions under all
other titles of the Act, including the one in question.' 89
Distinguishing Fleischmann'40 as involving a statute with meticulously detailed remedies marking "[t]he boundaries of the power 1to
4

award monetary relief in cases arising under the [Lanham] Act," '
the Supreme Court for the first time ratified the Third Circuit's holding
in Gartner that section 102 of the LMRDA does not meticulously detail the remedies available but broadly authorizes courts to grant relief

"as may be appropriate."' 42

The Court determined that "[n]ot to award counsel fees...
131. 412 U.S. at 9. See text accompanying notes 114-16 supra.
132. 412 U.S. at 2.
133. 66 CCH Lab. Cas. 1 11,953 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
134. Cole v. Hall, 462 F.2d 777 (2d Cir. 1972).
135. 29 U.S.C. § 411(a) (2) (1971), quoted innote 16 supra.
136. 412 U.S. at 3.
137. Id.at 4.
138. See statutes discussed innote 43 supra.
139. 412 U.S. at 12-13. Agreeing with Gartner and Yablonski, the Court distinguished these two sections (§§201(c) and 501(b)) as involving narrowly defined remedies and recognized that the relief necessary in Title I litigation cannot be as easily
foreseen nor meticulously specified. Id. This, the Court held, accounts for the vague
and broad language "as may be appropriate." 29 U.S.C. § 412 (1971), quoted in text
accompanying note 18 supra.
140. See text accompanying notes 64-67 supra.
141. 412 U.S. at 10, citing 386 U.S. at 721.
142. 29 U.S.C. § 412 (1971), quoted in text accompanying note 18 supra.
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would be tantamount to repealing the Act itself by frustrating its basic
purpose.' 1 43 Without such a remedy, "[a]n individual union member could not carry such a heavy burden . . . . [and] [t]he grant of
federal jurisdiction [would be] but an empty gesture for few union
members could avail themselves of it."'1 44 Since the award of attorney's fees is not determined by the mechanical operation of a statute,
the Court stressed that the allowance of the equitable remedy must be
14 5
predicated on the existence of an "appropriate" factual situation.
"[B]y vindicating his own right of free speech guaranteed by [sec-tion] 101 (a) (2) of Title I of the LMPDA, 140 respondent necessarily
rendered a substantial service to his union as an institution . . . and
to all of its members.' 47 Although the specific relief sought was
only the reinstatement of an individual union member, the Hall Court
concluded that the effect of the wage earner's suit furthered the right
48
of free expression, benefiting the union and its members as a whole.'
The Court explained:
When a union member is disciplined for the exercise of any of the
rights protected by Title I, the rights of all members of the union are
threatened. And, by vindicating his own right, the successful litigant
dispels the "chill" cast upon the rights of others. Indeed, to the extent
that such lawsuits contribute to the preservation of union democracy,
they frequently prove beneficial "not only in the immediate impact of
the results achieved but in their implications for the future conduct of
the union's affairs" . . . . We must therefore conclude that an award
of counsel fees to a successful plaintiff. . . falls squarely within the
traditional equitable power of federal courts to award such fees when49
ever "overriding considerations indicate the need for such recovery."'
143. 412 U.S. at 13, quoting Cole v. Hall, 462 F.2d at 780-81.
144. 412 U.S. at 13.
145. Id. at 10. The Court noted that the case had been pending for 10 years. In
accordance with Gartner and Yablonski, the Court found a lack of congressional intent
to deny to the courts the historic equitable power to grant counsel fees in appropriate
situations. Id. at 12-13. In an action to enforce a union member's rights, "the
relief must be tailored to fit facts and circumstances admitting of almost infinite
variety." 384 F.2d at 353.
146. 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(2) (1971), quoted in note 16 supra.
147. 412 U.S. at 8 (emphasis added). See also Comment, Allowance of Attorneys'
Fees in Civil Rights Actions, 1 COLUM. J.L. Soc. PROB. 381, 382 (1971) [hereinafter
Allowance].
148. 412 U.S. at 8.
149. Id. at 8-9, quoting 466 F.2d at 431 and 396 U.S. at 391-92. Dissenting, Justices White and Rehnquist voiced the same sentiments as Justice Black's dissent (note
128 supra) in Mills in advocating that a "far clearer signal from Congress" was
needed in order to award attorney's fees. 412 U.S. at 16. The dissent gives insufficient attention to the fact that Congress has remained silent on this controversy for
14 years, despite extensive litigation on the subject.
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Such language reaffirmed the position taken in Mills that the service
rendered, whether immediate or future, need not be pecuniary. 50
When no pecuniary benefit need be demonstrated, "[i]t . . . becomes

exceedingly difficult to trace the benefits of litigation to their ultimate
beneficiaries, so as to apportion the attorney's fees amongst them."''1 1
In order to further the goals of the Act and avoid inequitable allocation of fees, courts need to adopt a formula which is consistent with
both the purposes of the LMRDA and considerations of fairness" 2
in selecting the group that should bear the union member's counsel
fees. A "substantial benefit" connotes the conveyance of an immediate
benefit upon third parties to the lawsuit. In Sprague, for example, the
plaintiff's initial pecuniary recovery created an immediate right to a similar recovery in those whose situations were identical with hers prior to
suit.' 53 A "substantial service," however, connotes merely a potential
substantial benefit which will be conferred if and when another union
member should later find himself in the same position as the union
member who initially vindicated his own right. An example of such a
substantial service was found in Hall where an immediate and substantial benefit was received only by the individual union member who
was ordered reinstated in the union. All other union members, however, received the substantial service of a potential substantial benefit:' 54 the stare decisis effect of Hall should their rights ever be similarly infringed. By contrast, the entire union in Yablonski, in addition
to the individual litigant, had been the recipient of an immediate substantial benefit since the election violation adversely affected every wage
earner in the union. Thus, regardless of whether the benefit conveyed
to non-litigants is immediate or prospective, Hall treats the two as equally valid for purposes of determining that the benefit conferred is of
adequate substantiality to create an "appropriate" situation for an award
of attorney's fees. 155
150. 412 U.S. at 6 n.7.
151. La Raza Unida v. Volpe, 57 F.R.D. 94, 97 (N.D. Cal. 1972), discussing
Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. at 396.
152. See Comment, Counsel Fees in Stockholders' Derivative and Class ActionsHornstein Revisited, 6 U. RiCHMOND L.L 259, 270 (1972).
153. See text accompanying notes 80-86 supra.
154. 412 U.S. at 8.
155. Id. at 7-8. If the union member loses the litigation, he is not entitled to
attorney's fees since his action has produced neither an immediate nor a potential substantial benefit. The stare decisis effect is only created by a successful suit but query
whether fees would be totally denied to a party whose valid complaint, though ultimately
defeated on a procedural matter, triggered a subsequent and successful action by another individual similarly situated.

1974]

ATTORNEY'S FEES

Hall, however, failed to define the limits of a substantial service.

The Court never did clearly manifest what "overriding considerations"
are required or how substantial the service need be for an award of fees.
Although the Supreme Court did use substantial service terminology
when speaking of the service rendered to the union and its members

by the individual union member, it spoke only of benefits accruing to
the union and its members generally. Consequently, when the Court
cited "overriding considerations" as justifying an award of attorney's

fees, it was in reference to its own acknowledgment that private suits
under the LMRDA are necessary to protect individual employee
rights.156
Hall stands for the basic proposition that the purposes of the LMRDA

must not be weakened by forcing the costs of attorney's fees upon the
union member who successfully enforces his statutory rights by private
lawsuit. 157

The individual member is the litigant least able to afford

156. Id. at 8. The Court insisted that because a substantial service was rendered
by a union member in Hall, it became unnecessary for the Court to discuss alternative
theories which would merit the award of counsel fees. Id. at 6 n.7. The Court could
have reached the same result by holding federal policy sufficiently strong to necessitate
a fee award when a union member acts in the capacity of a "private attorney general"
vindicating a congressional policy of the highest priority in seeking to enforce the
rights of the class he represents. See, e.g., Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc.,
390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968). Involving the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e5(g), the Court granted an injunction and attorney's fees to a successful plaintiff since,
when he obtained the injunction, he did so not for himself alone but also as a private
attorney general vindicating a policy that Congress considered of the highest priority.
See also NAACP v. Allen, 340 F. Supp. 703, 708-09 (N.D. Ala. 1972), which held
that, in instituting the suit, plaintiffs served in the capacity of private attorneys general
seeking to enforce the rights of the class they represented. "If pursuant to this section,
plaintiffs have benefited their class and have effectuated congressional policy, they are
entitled to attorneys' fees." See also Lee v. Southern Home Sites, 444 F.2d 143, 148
(5th Cir. 1971), which said that "[tjo insure that individual litigants are willing to
act as private attorney generals to effectuate the public purposes of the statute, attorneys' fees should be . . . available . . . ." Thus, even absent a statutory provision
for recovery of fees, a private attorney general should be awarded attorney's fees when,
by enforcing a strong congressional policy, he has benefited a large class of people
and the necessity and financial burden of private enforcement are such as to make
the award essential. See 340 F. Supp. at 710. Thus, through the grant of counsel
fees when union members are functioning as "private attorneys general," the judicial
purpose is to encourage private suits, and thereby effectuate the purposes of the
LMRDA. See also Cox, Internal Affairs of Labor Unions Under the Labor Reform
Act of 1959, 58 MicH. L. REv. 819, 852 (1960).
157. 412 U.S. at 10. This is consistent with early federal decisions which used an
assortment of equitable tools to award relief "appropriate" to the necessities of each
particular case in which a union had violated a member's statutory right under the
LMRDA. Forms of relief which have been recognized under section 102 include:
strike benefits, Vars v. International Bhd. of Boilermakers, 215 F. Supp. 943, 952 (D.
Conn. 1963), affd on different grounds, 320 F.2d 576 (2d Cir. 1963); punitive damages,
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counsel fees. If forced to bear his own litigation expenses, he would
hardly ever be in a position to invoke the power of the federal courts
to effectuate the congressional policy by litigating legitimate claims. " "
Thus, instead of beginning with the traditional rule denying attorney's
fees and then ascertaining whether an exception to the rule had been
established, the Hall Court continued the recent trend of immediately
recognizing the courts' equitable power to grant fees in "appropriate"
situations with the burden of showing statutory language, legislative
history, or policy considerations to the contrary placed unequivocably
on the opponents of the award." 9 This change of court policy would
appear to make fee shifting the rule instead of the exception in litigation under Titles I and IV. Hall, however, does not expressly grant a
license for an award of attorney's fees in all cases arising under the
LMRDA. Instead, the Supreme Court addressed the matter to the discretion of the trial court,' 60 inviting varying, if not discordant, interpretations of "appropriateness." Thus courts, within their broad discretion, can even yet deny attorney's fees to a union member who successfully sues union management.'16 Such a judicial posture still conflicts with the policy of encouraging private enforcement and works a
serious hardship on the wage earner who has a valid dispute but inadequate financial resources to sue.16 2 The fact that the union member
seeking attorney's fees will have to win not only the merits of his case,
but the sympathy of the court as well, 0 3 can only serve to discourage
the initiation of meritorious litigation. "A rule that acts to discourage
the filing of meritorious claims is of dubious value"' 4 and should be
Farowitz v. Local 802, Associated Musicians of Greater N.Y., 241 F. Supp. 895, 909
(S.D.N.Y. 1965); injury to reputation with accompanying mental anguish, Simmons v.
Avisco, Local 713, Textiles Workers Union, 350 F.2d 1012, 1019 (4th Cir. 1965).
158. 466 F.2d at 431. See, e.g., 110 CONG. REc. 6541 (1964) (remarks of Senator
Humphrey).
159. See Lee, 444 F.2d at 147, a civil rights case which held that courts should
award attorney's fees to successful plaintiffs unless special circumstances exist which
would render such an award unjust. See also, Comment, The Allocation of Attorneys'
Fees After Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 38 U. Cm. L. Rav. 316, 325 (1971) [hereinafter Comment].
160. 412 U.S. at 15.
161. See Comment, note 159 supra, at 319, and Benefit, note 162 infra, at 281.
162. See Comment, Attorneys' Fees: What Constitutes a "Benefit" Sufficient to
Award Fees from Third Party Beneficiaries, 1972 WAsH. U.L.Q. 271, 279 [hereinafter
Benefit] and Comment, note 159 supra, at 336.
163. See Note, Attorneys' Fees in Shareholder Derivative Suits: The Substantial
Benefit Rule Reexamined, 60 CALIF. L. REv. 164, 165 (1972) [hereinafter Substantial
Benefit].
164. Id. at 187.
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replaced by a rationale strictly equating "appropriate" situations with
successful litigation.' 65
Nevertheless, the substantial service test of Hall provides wide boun-

daries and the principles it embraces may lend themselves in future litigation to the most expansive judicial development. By failing
to articulate the requirements of a substantial service other than the
successful disclosure and enforcement of a Title I violation, the Court
opened the judicial doors for a potential grant of attorney's fees in

every lawsuit terminating in a finding of liability. Instead of burdening the union member with worrying whether a potential service of

adequate substantiality exists to later justify an award of fees, courts
should interpret Hall as broadly advocating that winning on the merits
always establishes an adequate service to warrant an award. Any

lawsuit successfully enforcing a statutory obligation under the LMtRDA
has sufficient therapeutic value'
Halltest. 6. 7

66

to justify an award of fees under the

Since all successful suits thus provide an adequate benefit or service, the court's discretion should be exercised only as to the amount

of fees awarded not to the question of whether they should be granted.
165. See text accompanying notes 166-71 infra. Success is not solely limited to a
final adjudication on the merits. See Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. at 389.
The filing of a complaint, the holding of a hearing on a preliminary injunction, and
action ending in settlement, or an action rendered moot by the union's unilateral action
is deemed successful if it was responsible for procuring all the relief required. See
Kahan v. Rosenstiel, 424 F.2d 161, 166 (3d Cir. 1970), and Fletcher v. A.J. Indus.,
Inc., 266 Cal. App. 2d 313, 325, 72 Cal. Rptr. 146, 154 (1968), where attorney's fees
were awarded in a suit which terminated in a settlement. See also Schechtman v.
Wolfson, 244 F.2d 537, 540 (2d Cir. 1957), where fee-shifting was allowed in a suit
rendered moot by defendant's unilateral action. The litigation stage attained is only
significant as to the amount of attorney's fees granted, and not as to the issue of
whether or not they should be awarded at all. See Substantial Benefit, note 163 supra,
at 183.
166. See text accompanying notes 7, 9, and 122 supra.
167. See text accompanying notes 154-56 supra. One could even read Hall to advocate that the very existence of the LMRDA establishes that its attempted, although
unsuccessful, enforcement has a substantially beneficial effect. See Comment, note 159
supra, at 334. A service may be substantial although it does not, and may never,
confer an actual substantial benefit on the union or its other members. To award
fees in all bona fide assertions of rights guaranteed by the Act, irrespective of success
or failure, would recognize that it is really the totality of attempts at enforcement,
and not merely the successful actions, which provide the paramount substantial service of a vigorous campaign of enforcement which best protects those rights guaranteed
by the LMRDA. Such a course of action would also eliminate from each individual
action the uncertain discretionary factor of a determination of adequate substantiality
which can only serve to inhibit the filing of legitimate claims. See text accompanying notes 160-65 supra.
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The court's discretionary powers should not be permitted to interfere
with the effective enforcement of the LMRDA but should only be
employed to vary the amount of fees granted to conform to the evil
proven and the costs incurred. If a union member is successful in
vindicating important statutory policies, his suit should be deemed
meritorious per se, and he should be awarded at least minimal fees, 0 8
with any additional amounts being dependent on what is reasonable
under the circumstances.1 9 Such a limitation on judicial discretion
would assure adequate attorney's fees for all successful actions. The
possibility of recovering a larger amount (proportional to the benefit
conferred or service rendered) would provide an added incentive to
union members and their attorneys to initiate litigation that supports
responsible union management.
It must, however, be recognized that if such a "successful-equalsappropriate" rationale were extended to include successful defendant
unions, the private enforcement that Hall attempted to promote would
be frustrated. If a wage earner were to be penalized for a good faith

error through liability for the union's counsel fees, legitimate lawsuits would be discouraged, rather than encouraged, in all but the most
clear-cut cases. 70 However, a justifiable concern for unions could be
effectuated by allowing them to recover counsel fees, but only in cases
of bad faith or frivolous conduct on the part of a union member.'"'
Such a construction of Hall would avoid the imposition of an unnecessary hardship on poor plaintiffs and, at the same time, protect the policy
72
of encouraging litigation.'
Opposition to the judicial expansion of "substantial service" stems
from the fear that union members will be encouraged to file unmeritor168. See Substantial Benefit, note 163 supra, at 190, and Benefit, note 162 supra,
at 284.
169. See, e.g., Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 387, 409 (N.D. Ala. 1972), which
enumerated several factors to be considered by courts in determining the amount of
the award. These include: the intricacy of the case, the difficulty of proof, time
reasonably expended in the preparation and trial of the case, degree of competence
displayed by the attorney, benefit inuring to the public, and personal hardships suffered
by plaintiff and his attorney.
170. See Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. at 718, which
recognized that the remedy of attorney's fees is used sparingly because "[t]he poor
might be unjustly discouraged from instituting actions to vindicate their rights if the
penalty for losing included the fees of their opponents' counsel."
171. See, e.g., Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402. See
also Allowance, note 147 supra, at 394-95, and Benefit, note 162 supra, at 284. See
also note 77 supra.
172. See Benefit, note 162 supra, at 289.
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ious strike suits' 73 merely for harassment purposes at the union's expense. Such a fear deserves some discussion.
Present statutory requirements that a union member first exhaust
his intra-union remedies under Title 1,174 or file a complaint with the
Secretary of Labor under Title IV,' 7 ' before filing a private action
should successfully discourage most strike suits at their inception. Additionally, union members and their attorneys will only file suit where
there is a realistic possibility for success and will not assume the costs of
litigation when there is no realistic potential for achieving the success
on the merits required to receive an award of attorney's fees. Both
the requirement that the litigation prove successful and the expense involved in bringing an unsuccessful suit provide deterrents to the filing
of strike or nuisance suits. 17 6 Courts could also impose the added burden of the union's counsel fees on those union members who do initiate frivolous suits. 7 7 Although the above-mentioned procedures will
not eliminate every harassing action, the few frivolous suits that will be
filed by union members must be balanced against the recognized value
of awards of attorney's fees as a means of ensuring responsible union
management. The cost for such a worthwhile objective would still be
more than acceptable.
CONCLUSION

Hall was an attempt to reconcile outdated judicial theories regarding
awards of attorney's fees with enlightened congressional policies concerning the relations between unions and their members. Its holding
draws wide new boundaries for the permissible award of fees to individual union members in suits protecting the rights guaranteed them
by the LMRDA. As such, the case provides a tool to achieve the congressional aim. For the tool to be truly effective, however, such awards
must be made mandatory in every successful suit. If Hall did not
follow this path, it at least left the way unobstructed. The only remaining question is whether the work advanced by Hall will yet be
finished.
Robert D. Vogel
173. A "strike suit" is an action begun with the hope of winning large attorney's
fees or a private settlement with no intention of directly or indirectly benefiting the
corporation or class on behalf of which suit is theoretically brought. Shapiro v.
Magaziner, 210 A.2d 890, 894 (Pa. 1965).
174. See statute quoted in note 16 supra (§ 101 (a) (4) proviso).
175. See notes 101-02 supra.
176. See Benefit, note 162 supra, at 284.
177. See note 77 supra.

